by Michael Orfanos
Ten days ago, French and British officials announced their agreement to mutually deploy attack helicopters against forces loyal to Gaddafi. Alain Juppe, France’s Foreign Minister stated that helicopters will not be used to deploy NATO troops to the Libyan soil. This will be a strictly an air-based operation. For all global news, stay tuned to www.naro.gr
NATO’s decision to deploy attack helicopters can be explained by a number of reasons. First of all, up until now, NATO forces would use long range air-strikes (from 15.000 feet distance) against the Libyan army. This can be very effective when bombing military buildings & installations, but can be proven equally ineffective, when used to bomb small military detachments or mechanized divisions.
Second, this way of conducting military operations can be especially harmful to civilians or rebel forces; NATO cannot always identify them properly, since most Libyan forces are now wearing civilian clothes, hide their armor in public buildings and use civilian cars in order to move rapidly and engage the enemy. There are at least two logged incidents-up until today- where rebel forces, accidentally, received friendly fire from NATO forces.
Third, NATO forces have realized that the situation in Libya today is a –fait accompli- stalemate and they want to break it, in favor of the rebels. This means that both sides are incapable of ending the war. The Libyan forces, are under constant fire by NATO’s air strikes, most of their armored divisions are destroyed while the remaining face great difficulty in moving in a plain site terrain-Libya’s terrain can be generally characterized as flat land with no natural obstacles and lacking the wooded terrain that would help the armored divisions to move unnoticed. The rebels on the other hand, may control Libya’s Eastern provinces, but they lack the weaponry, they are untrained to contact organized battle operations, they also do not have a central military figure to direct them and a clear battle plan. This means that both sides do not have the ability to enforce a “coup de grace” to one other and end the war-each side for their own reasons.
Realizing the actual stalemate is one thing. But which side is going to have the upper hand in the long run? Well, it is the author’s belief that time is running out for the rebel forces, and that’s why NATO officials are embracing the reality of a closer engagement with the Libyan forces and dealing with the potential public unrest from NATO personnel casualties. First of all, Libyan forces can regroup and adapt to NATO bombings-which they have. Second, they know that rebels do not have the resources or the plan to attack them. Indeed, rebels are engaging the enemy as unorganized bands, thinking locally (their modus operandi is restricted to skirmishes and fighting in their own city), and without a clear battle plan. Third, the rebel forces sooner or later will be forced to scatter and disband, since they have to support their families and provide for them or protect their properties, while Libyan forces don’t. In addition, the Libyans forces have complete control and use of all government media (TV, radio, etc.) propagandizing and brainwashing the civilian population in favor of their troops, trying to win sympathy of the masses. We all remember Gaddafi showing up on Libyan TV as a rock star, calling rebels a “drug crazed mob” or announcing a 150% increase in wages for all civil servants, and $400 to every family loyal to the regime. Make no mistake about it: Gaddafi knows the power and influence of the media and is effectively using it for his behalf. Moreover, the increasing death toll of citizens is more probable to demoralize the rebels (forcing them to surrender) than Gaddafi’s troops-since a substantial number of them being Eastern European mercenaries that they are not affected by slaying of local population ( they have no families or relatives).
One must consider if NATO really had any other alternative. I must admit that I cannot think of any other (alternative)-with the exception of assassinating Gaddafi: the driving force behind Libya’s armed forces. NATO already tried, but up until now they were unsuccessful.
As a conclusion, we can speculate that NATO’s decision to deploy attack helicopters in Libyan soil, may result in NATO personnel casualties, since these helicopters may be able to manoeuvre and attack small enemy units in relative build up areas or small cities, but at the same time, they are vulnerable to handheld rocket launchers, grenades or even enemy concentrated rifle fire. Could this turn into a new “Black Hawk Down” scenario or will this helicopter operation run smoothly and without any NATO personnel losses? Let’s hope for the best, but I can’t help remembering what the great Moltke used to say: “No battle plan survives contact with the enemy”.
Michael Orfanos is Marketing Manager and SEO Expert for www.naro.gr
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